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Abstract 
Background: One of the biggest barriers to accessing safe surgical and anesthetic care is lack of trained providers. 
Uganda has one of the largest deficits in anesthesia providers in the world, and though they are increasing in number, 
they remain concentrated in the capital city. Salary is an oft‑cited barrier to rural job choice, yet the size and sources 
of anesthesia provider incomes are unclear, and so the potential income loss from taking a rural job is unknown. Addi‑
tionally, while salary augmentation is a common policy proposal to increase rural job uptake, the relative importance 
of non‑monetary job factors in job choice is also unknown.
Methods: A survey on income sources and magnitude, and a Discrete Choice Experiment examining the relative 
importance of monetary and non‑monetary factors in job choice, was administered to 37 and 47 physician anesthesi‑
ologists in Uganda, between May–June 2019.
Results: No providers worked only at government jobs. Providers earned most of their total income from a non‑
government job (50% of income, 23% of working hours), but worked more hours at their government job (36% of 
income, and 44% of working hours). Providers felt the most important job attributes were the quality of the facility 
and scope of practice they could provide, and the presence of a colleague (33% and 32% overall relative importance). 
These were more important than salary and living conditions (14% and 12% importance).
Conclusions: No providers accepted the salary from a government job alone, which was always augmented by 
other work. However, few providers worked only nongovernment jobs. Non‑monetary incentives are powerful 
influencers of job preference, and may be leveraged as policy options to attract providers. Salary continues to be an 
important driver of job choice, and jobs with fewer income generating opportunities (e.g. private work in rural areas) 
are likely to need salary augmentation to attract providers.
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Introduction
There is an urgent need to address the global lack of 
access to safe anesthetic and surgical care, a problem 
faced by more than five billion individuals worldwide 
[1]. One of the most important contributors to this 
problem is the limited number of trained surgical and 
anesthetic providers [1]. While the recommended den-
sity of physician anesthesiologists is 4–5 per 100,000 
people, many countries fall short, with the World 
Health Organization (WHO) African region having just 
1.58 total anesthesia providers per 100,000 people [2, 
3].
In Uganda, there are only 0.18 physician anesthesia 
providers per 100,000 people, and four of the top ten 
health sector vacancies are for surgery and anesthesia 
providers [4]. The Ugandan Ministry of Health histori-
cally aimed to address this deficit by training physician 
anesthetists and Anesthetic Officers (AOs, a cadre of 
non-physician providers with a background as a clinical 
officer or nurse, and with extra training in anesthesia). 
The government has posted vacancies for anesthesia 
providers throughout the country, but though newly 
graduating anesthesiologists have entered the work-
force since 2000, the vast majority of these positions 
remain vacant [4, 5]. Geographic maldistribution 
remains an issue; nearly all of the specialist physician 
providers practice in the capital city of Kampala (with 
a few in the closest regional centers nearby), while the 
large majority (76%) of the population lives in rural 
areas [6]. At the time of the study, at least 20 physician 
anesthesiologists were employed at hospitals in Kam-
pala, whereas only four were working at Regional Refer-
ral Hospitals (RRH). As each RRH is planned to have 
two physician anesthesiologist positions, this works out 
to a vacancy rate of 87.5%. Most anesthesia outside the 
capital is provided by AOs, yet there is high turnover, 
and many areas have no provider at all; the AO vacancy 
rate is likely > 70% [4, 5]. Although provider numbers 
are increasing, the urban–rural disparity persists, and 
the optimal strategy for addressing this is not known.
Attracting and retaining healthcare workers to 
rural areas is a common problem [7, 8]. Several stud-
ies have explored the determinants and effectiveness 
of incentives to work rurally in both high- [9–13] and 
low-income countries [14–19]. Clearly, salary deter-
mines the financial viability of working in a rural area 
(as well as the opportunity to supplement salary with 
an additional clinical job or nonclinical work) [20–23]. 
However, additional factors also strongly influence the 
choice of employment location, like availability of job 
postings, working conditions, professional support, 
administrative burden, opportunity for promotion, 
lack of career advancement opportunities, schools for 
children, and transportation difficulties [17, 21–27]. 
Neither salary nor non-monetary job factors can be 
ignored in designing strategies to attract workers out-
side urban areas.
Rurality impacts the provision of specialty care 
like surgery and anesthesia in specific ways. Low case 
volumes, availability of other members of the perio-
perative team, or the hospital system to support perio-
perative care, are unique challenges [28, 29]. Rural care 
faces many similar challenges in well resourced coun-
tries and in low resource countries, but differences 
can exist. For instance, while well resourced countries 
face barriers with equipment supply and low opera-
tive volumes, some low resource countries continue 
to struggle with inconsistent access to basic monitors, 
resuscitative equipment, or even electricity [23, 30, 
31]. In these settings, an evidence-informed approach 
to human resource allocation is extremely important. 
Tacitly, it is suggested that government salary alone 
is insufficient for providers, but the actual amount of 
income given up when providers work only at a govern-
ment job is unknown without understanding what they 
can make from all sources. The objectives of this study 
were to determine the actual composition of physician 
anesthesia provider incomes, the relative importance of 
the factors affecting recruitment and retention to rural 
areas, and to generate an evidence base for workforce 
policy.
Methods
This study was conducted with two surveys of physi-
cian anesthesia providers in Uganda. The first survey 
gathered information about sources and magnitude of 
income from all sources, to establish reference points 
for salary options in the discrete choice experiment 
(DCE). The second survey was a discrete choice experi-
ment to understand how important different factors 
were relative to each other (and to salary). This study 
was reviewed and approved by the University of Cali-
fornia, San Francisco institutional review board (IRB), 
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the Mbale Regional Referral Hospital Research and 
Ethics Committee, and with official support from the 
Association of Anesthesiologists of Uganda.
Eligibility
Specialist physician anesthesia providers who had com-
pleted training and were currently practicing in Uganda 
were eligible.
Income survey
The income survey was developed based on previous 
work examining income composition for healthcare 
workers in low-income countries [21, 22]. Categories 
included demographic information, government-paid 
and non-governmental anesthesia jobs, and non-clinical 
sources of income (e.g. teaching, farming, consultancy, 
and other personal business). Responses were reported as 
descriptive statistics. Work hours were asked as a meas-
ure of effort; using full or part time status, or number of 
days worked, was considered as a measure of effort, but 
there was concern that the level of effort per day or per 
full time job might vary considerably. Salary and work 
hours were asked as ranges, and the midpoint was taken 
for mean calculations. Respondents were also asked to 
report their total amount of salary earned as a single 
estimate. Mean salaries were weighted by number of 
respondents, as not all respondents held each type of job.
Discrete choice experiment
A discrete choice experiment is a type of quantitative 
technique used to elicit participant preferences between 
two or more scenarios (in this case, job choices). By 
presenting multiple jobs with varying attributes, the 
relative importance of each attribute and the trade offs 
required to accept a job can be determined. The DCE 
methodology guidelines established by WHO, the Inter-
national Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes 
Research, and Intrahealth were followed [32–35]. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted at the Association 
of Anesthesiologists of Uganda (AAU) national meeting 
to develop a list of job attributes deemed important in 
selecting a rural position, and participants were asked to 
rank attributes in order of importance. The top six attrib-
utes were selected to be included in the DCE. Based on 
language used in the interviews, descriptions of desirable 
Table 1 Discrete choice experiment attributes and levels
Attribute Levels
Facility quality and scope of practice
The extent to which you are able to provide the care you were trained for, 
given the availability of resources such as essential drugs, equipment, 
electricity and personnel
(a) Can provide a wide scope of care you have been trained for, with con‑
sistent availability of facility resources (e.g. drugs, equipment, electricity 
and human resources)
(b) Can provide limited care due to inconsistent availability of facility 
resources (e.g. drugs, equipment, electricity and human resources)
Salary
A change in salary with respect to the salary scale indicated above
(a) Unchanged from the current salary scale
(b) Increased by 500,000 shillings
(c) Increased by 1,000,000 shillings
(d) Increased by 2,000,000 shillings
(e) Increased by 3,000,000 shillings
Living conditions
The type of your house in addition to access to basic utilities such as 
power, water, and internet
(a) A room or house for one person, poorly maintained (e.g. rare access to 
utilities like water, electricity, and internet, in a slum)
(b) A room or house for one person, and sometimes maintained (e.g. occa‑
sional access to utilities like water, electricity, and internet, near a slum)
(c) A house with enough room for a family, and sometimes maintained 
(e.g. occasional access to utilities like water, electricity, and internet, near 
a slum)
(d) A house with enough room for a family, and well‑maintained (e.g. con‑
sistent access to utilities like water, electricity, and internet, not in a slum)
Presence of a colleague
Having another anesthesia provider (physician or anesthetic officer) work‑
ing with you at a facility
(a) There is an anesthetic officer working at your facility
(b) There is a physician anesthesiologist working at your facility
(c) You are the only anesthesia provider in your facility
Career advancement
Presence of opportunities to attend continuing medical education 
courses and trainings
(a) There are limited opportunities for additional training and courses
(b) There are financially unsupported opportunities for additional training 
and courses
(c) There are financially supported opportunities for additional training and 
courses
Promotion opportunities
Presence of opportunities to earn a promotion with expanded responsi‑
bilities and pay after some time
(a) There is limited opportunity for promotion
(b) There are opportunities for promotion after some time
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and undesirable levels of these attributes were created 
(Table  1). 3,000,000 UGX was set as the upper limit of 
salary augmentation, representing 70–80% of a physi-
cian anesthesiologist’s government salary (3,750,000–
4,200,000 UGX for Medical Officers Special Grade or 
Consultants at the time). This was chosen to be tangibly 
attractive to providers without being unrealistically high. 
An example of one job pair is given in Fig. 1.
Recruitment
The AAU maintains a current list of practicing anesthe-
siologists in Uganda. The income survey was distributed 
Fig. 1 Sample Discrete Choice Experiment Question. An example of one of the 24 different job pairs. The attributes changed in each pair according 
to the values in Table 1
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electronically to members of the AAU mailing list and 
WhatsApp groups, and attendees of the annual AAU 
conference. Once the DCE was created, links were sent 
by email to the Association membership, and again via 
the AAU’s WhatsApp group. Reminders to encourage 
survey completion were sent to individual physicians by 
phone or WhatsApp.
Both the income survey and DCE could be collected 
electronically or in person, depending on participant 
preference. Electronic surveys contained the participant 
information sheet, and participants were advised that 
completion of the surveys constituted consent. Study 
personnel met the participants to complete the surveys 
in person if it was more convenient for them; in that 
case the surveys were completed either on a laptop or 
on paper. Participants completing the surveys in-person 
received the information sheet, signed a consent form, 
and were left alone to complete the survey. The consent 
forms could not be linked to the responses and were 
stored in a separate location from the data.
Given the sensitive nature of the salary data in particu-
lar, anonymity was important both to protect partici-
pants and ensure validity of results. Both surveys were 
anonymous, with no participant identifying information 
included (e.g. name, date of birth, name of hospital). A 
previously created database of the physician anesthesia 
providers in Uganda was used to track which physicians 
had reported completion of the DCE, but completion sta-
tus could not be linked to responses as both the income 
survey and DCE were anonymized.
Statistical analysis
There are several heuristics and guidelines to calculate 
a discrete choice experiment sample size [36]. One such 
heuristic to estimate the minimum sample size for a dis-
crete choice experiment is to multiply 500 by the maxi-
mum number of levels in an attribute (five in our study) 
divided by the product of the number of choice sets 
(n = 24) and the number of alternatives in each choice 
set (n = 2). This calculation suggests that 52 respond-
ents would provide sufficient statistical power to analyze 
the main effects in our study. We gain further statistical 
power by adding a “neither” option to each choice set.
We used the Choice Modelling platform (JMP Pro, 
Version 14) to develop 24 choice sets using a D-optimal, 
fractional factorial, balanced design to maximize design 
efficiency. Each choice described two hypothetical job 
options based on varying the levels of the six attributes. 
The respondents were asked to select their preferred job 
option for each of the 24 choice sets. All choice sets also 
included a “neither” option, in the event that the respond-
ent found the jobs equally appealing or unappealing.
We used effects coding to center the levels within a 
given attribute around zero. The marginal utility of each 
attribute level was estimated using conditional logit mod-
eling. We calculated the monetary trade-offs associated 
with changes in the attribute levels using marginal rates 
of substitution. The relative importance of each attrib-
ute was determined by the ratio of the LogWorth asso-
ciated with a given attribute divided by the sum of the 
LogWorth values for all of the attributes. The LogWorth, 
also called the S-value, is the negative base-10 logarithm 
of the P-value for the given attribute [37]. The analyses 
were performed using JMP Pro Version 14 (SAS Institute, 
Cary, NC).
Results
Approximately 70 providers were practicing in the coun-
try and therefore eligible to participate. A total of 37 and 
47 providers participated in the income and DCE surveys 
for response rates of 53% and 67%. 28% and 35% of pro-
viders practiced outside Kampala. For the income survey, 
Table 2 Respondent characteristics (n, %)
a The clinical job categories of “government”, “nongovernment”, and “both” are 
exclusive; respondents could only select one. 54% also selected nonclinical 
work, which was in addition to their clinical jobs
Salary DCE
n = 37 n = 47
Median Age (range) 32 (29–65) 33 (30–52)
Male Sex 19 (0.51) 30 (0.64)
Marital status
 Cohabitating 2 (0.06) 5 (0.11)
 Divorced 1 (0.03) –
 Married 18 (0.5) 26 (0.55)
 Single 15 (0.42) 16 (0.34)
Practice years
 < 1 year – 4 (0.09)
 1–3 12 (0.35) 13 (0.28)
 3–5 11 (0.32) 14 (0.3)
 5–10 8 (0.24) 9 (0.19)
 > 10 years 3 (0.09) 7 (0.15)
Has  joba
 Govt only –
 Nongovt only 11 (0.30)
 Both 26 (0.70)
 Nonclinical 20 (0.54)
Number of jobs (mean) 1.9
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the mean age of the respondents was 35 years, with 35% 
of providers having practiced for 1–3  years (56% had 
practiced for 3–10 years) (Table 2). Respondent charac-
teristics for the DCE are found in Table 2.
Physician anesthesia providers held 1.9 jobs on average. 
Most reported having both government and nongovern-
ment jobs (70%), with none reporting holding only a gov-
ernment job. Most providers reported earning income 
from nonclinical sources in addition to their clinical job 
(54%).
Income composition and weekly hours worked
Physicians most commonly reported earning a monthly 
income of $1600–$2390 USD (UGX 6–9 million) from 
all sources (28%). Physicians reported earning the most 
income from a non-government job (50% of total income) 
(Table 3). On average, physicians reported working clini-
cally an average of 30.1 h per week, with the most effort 
by hours in their government job (44%).
Discrete choice experiment
Of the rural job attributes presented, physicians placed 
the greatest relative importance on the facility quality 
and scope of practice, and presence of a colleague (32% 
and 31% relative importance), with salary and living con-
ditions coming next (15% and 13%) (Table 4). Promotion 
and career advancement were less important. Respond-
ents were given the option to choose neither job if nei-
ther were suitable; this option was much less important 
(3%).
Table 3 Mean physician income, by job type
NR Not reported. NB: Not all respondents had all jobs, so percentages do not correspond to proportion of total means. E.g. the mean salary of physicians with 
nonclinical work was $430, but nonclinical work accounted for 9% of overall reported salary
Mean salary in USD (range) % Mean hours %
Salary and job type
 Government job $920 (399–1993) 0.36 35.00 0.44
 Non‑government job $1020 (199–1993) 0.50 18.33 0.23
 2nd NG job $650 (199–1196) 0.05 10.00 0.06
 3rd NG job $300 (199–399)  < 0.00 NR NR
 Nonclinical work $430 (66–1196) 0.09 10.12 0.28
 Overall mean $1900 (266–4385) 1 30.1 1
Table 4 Relative importance of included attributes
Salary levels correspond to USD $0, $130, $270, $530, $800
Attribute
Attribute Importance (%) 95% CI p value
Facility quality & scope of 
practice
31.9 28.8–35.0  < .01
Presence of colleague 30.9 27.9–34.0  < .01
Salary 14.6 12.3–16.9  < .01
Living conditions 13.0 10.8–15.2  < .01
Promotion 3.5 2.3–4.7  < .01
Career advancement 3.4 2.2–4.6  < .01
No job 2.7 1.6–3.7  < 0.01
Table 5 Monetary compensation associated with included 
attribute levels
Attribute and levels Trade-off 
amount 
(UGX)
Facility quality & scope of practice
 Wide scope –






 Poor, limited 2,747,004
 One person, inconsistent 1,913,005
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Deterrents of job choice were quantified as the mon-
etary compensation required for a given circumstance 
(Table  5). The biggest deterrent of rural jobs included 
in our study was being the only anesthesia provider 
at the hospital (UGX 3,907,827). Other major deter-
rents included poor and limited living conditions (UGX 
2,747,004), and a limited facility and scope of practice 
(UGX 2,987,364).
Discussion
This study suggests three main findings. First, salary is 
an important consideration in job choice. Second, non-
government jobs are a significant component of salary 
for most providers. Third, some non-monetary incen-
tives are as or more important motivators as salary in 
job selection. The majority of providers in Uganda hold 
both government and non-government jobs to reach 
their target income (around $1600-$2390 USD). In 
Uganda, government jobs in rural areas pay the same as 
the equivalent position in an urban area. The fact that no 
physicians held only government jobs suggests that some 
aspects of more rural jobs, likely salary, are insufficient. 
Existing literature reports that dual private–public prac-
tice is common among providers in Africa, and providers 
may believe or know that it will be harder to find these 
practice arrangements in rural areas [25, 38, 39]. A gov-
ernmental “hardship” supplement for providers working 
in hard-to-reach areas exists, but may not overcome the 
reduced ability to augment income with non-government 
work.
The majority of providers held both government and 
non-government jobs, instead of working only at a 
higher-paying private sector non-government job. There 
may be a variety of reasons for this, such as insufficient 
availability of non-government job hours, prestige from 
a government position, opportunity to teach or conduct 
research, academic career growth, a sense of obliga-
tion, or altruism. This also suggests that providers may 
respond to incentives other than increased pay, a finding 
confirmed by the DCE. For instance, working alone was 
a notably important deterrent. There may be several rea-
sons why this is, but in several other studies an impor-
tant factor has been the guaranteed ability to time off, 
which may be difficult if there are no other providers to 
fill the role [17, 40, 41]. Another reason may be that the 
workload is unmanageable when working without much 
professional support [23]. Having a second provider may 
ameliorate both concerns.
The other important attributes in our study are in line 
with other studies. Facility quality has consistently been 
an important factor in choosing rural jobs, for instance 
among medical students in Uganda and clinical officers in 
Kenya (after tuition support, not included in our model) 
[17, 26]. Housing support was most important to Ethio-
pian doctors and Kenyan clinical officers, but somewhat 
less so for Ugandan medical students [18, 19]. Housing 
may be particularly important where infrastructure is 
poor [14]. There are some discrepancies with other litera-
ture, such as facility quality being less important to medi-
cal students in Laos and housing being less important to 
Ugandan medical students [16, 19]. This may represent 
how priorities change after completing training, and 
the realities of rural life become apparent, and may also 
reflect differences in factors that are important in recruit-
ment compared to retention in rural areas (‘pull’ vs ‘stick’ 
factors) [23].
These nonfinancial incentives may be important levers 
that can be used by the government to attract providers 
to rural areas. For instance, working in a quality facil-
ity with a wide scope of practice and not working alone 
were as valuable to physician anesthesia providers as a 
significant salary increase. This represents a substantial 
policy opportunity; instead of additional funds allocated 
to retain a single provider, the equivalent amount may be 
put toward the salary of a second provider or improving 
the quality of the health facility. This has a dual benefit, 
not only providing the same retention incentive, but also 
improving the healthcare infrastructure at the same time, 
for the same cost. A practical example are nascent anes-
thesia ‘hubs’ developing with more than one anesthesia 
faculty in cities with teaching institutions, like Kabale, 
Mbale and Mbarara. Spent in this way, governments can 
obtain a significant benefit for the same healthcare spend. 
Additionally, while promotion and career advancement 
were less important than other factors, they may be more 
easily addressed than salary.
While it is possible for a job to attract providers with-
out a salary increment, most other elements of the job 
would need to be ideal. Thus, it is unlikely that attract-
ing and retaining providers to rural jobs without some 
amount of salary augmentation will be successful. Our 
findings are thus in line with other studies on rural reten-
tion that a package of incentives (including salary and 
other elements of job satisfaction) has the highest likeli-
hood of success.
This study has some limitations. First, while the 
participants comprise over half of the total practicing 
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physician anesthesia workforce, the sample size lim-
ited our ability to subsegment the population for fur-
ther analysis. The design of the survey allows for the 
possibility of self-selection bias, but also mitigates the 
likely reasons for opting out (namely privacy). Second, 
the DCE methodology intends to capture the most 
important job attributes, but cannot capture all attrib-
utes important to everyone. We included attributes 
based on qualitative work in Uganda and prior litera-
ture, but not all important factors could be included, 
as each increases the required number of survey ques-
tions significantly. Attributes that were very meaning-
ful to a subgroup (for instance, women or those with 
families), or several minor attributes that have collec-
tive importance would not be captured. Additionally, 
there may be other attributes associated with rural 
jobs that are unmeasured and may affect job choice. 
Inclusion of a rural attribute as part of the DCE would 
be useful in future studies. Third, though we worked 
with providers to define language that was meaning-
ful in this context (including scenario examples), some 
individual interpretation was unavoidable. Fourth, 
only the aspect of rural anesthesia job demand was 
examined; in some places, available funding for an 
anesthesia job posting (rural anesthesia job supply) is 
also limited. Fifth, anesthetic officers, who also pro-
vide anesthesia, were not captured. In discussions 
with AOs, it was clear that the factors affecting their 
choice to work rurally were much different than physi-
cians (e.g. much more focused on salary and workload, 
leading to high turnover). While their scope of practice 
is technically similar to physicians (providing an anes-
thetic for an operation), the quality of these services 
can be quite variable. It seemed pertinent to focus on 
physicians as a near term goal to also address AO qual-
ity and turnover. Nevertheless, AOs will necessarily be 
part of the solution to increase rural anesthesia cover-
age, and strategies to improve their retention and qual-
ity should simultaneously be sought..
Though this was a single-country study, the work-
ing conditions and remuneration schemes are likely 
to be similar to other low-income countries and other 
hospital based procedural specialties (e.g. surgeons 
and obstetricians). While the marginal utilities may 
differ, the finding that non-monetary incentives can 
be more important than salary is likely to be impor-
tant throughout the region, enhancing the general-
izability of these findings. Inclusion of surgeons and 
obstetricians in future studies will help verify if the 
value of incentives is consistent, and a larger sample 
could look at demographic subgroups. Lastly, stud-
ies on the total cost of incentive packages should be 




Table. 6 Marginal utility of included attributes and levels
Attribute Level Marginal utility 95% CI p value
Levels
 Facil levels ity & scope Wide scope 0.51 0.41 to 0.61  < 0.01
Limited scope − 0.51 − 0.61 to − 0.41
  Salary+ Per 1,000,000 UGX 0.34 0.24 to 0.43  < 0.01
 Living conditions Poor, limited − 0.51 − 0.70 to − 0.33  < .01
One person, inconsistent − 0.23 − 0.41 to − 0.05
Family, inconsistent 0.42 0.25 to 0.59
Family, consistent 0.32 0.13 to 0.51
 Colleague AO 0.17 0.01 to 0.32  < 0.01
MD 0.58 0.44 to 0.73
Solo − 0.75 − 0.91 to − 0.59
 Career advancement Limited − 0.25 0.40 to − 0.10  < 0.01
Unsupported 0.05 − 0.10 to 0.19
Supported 0.20 0.06 to 0.34
 Promotion Limited − 0.16 − 0.25 to − 0.06  < 0.01
Available 0.16 0.06 to 0.25
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